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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Arturo Flores was convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled substance
following a jury trial and was sentenced as a persistent violator to two unified terms of 15 years,
with three years fixed, to be served concurrently. He appeals from his judgment of conviction,
challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress because the officer who stopped the vehicle in which Mr. Flores
was traveling never investigated the traffic violation which purportedly formed the basis for the
stop, but instead conducted a drug investigation from the outset, which was not supported by
reasonable suspicion of drug activity.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Meridian Police Department received a report on October 26, 2016, from a 14-yearold girl who said her parents were using heroin at the family’s residence in East Moskee Street
(“the Moskee residence”). (R., p.106.) The police had also been notified by a “concerned
citizen” that there was a large amount of stop-and-go traffic at the Moskee residence.
(R., p.107.) The police department began undercover surveillance of the Moskee residence at
approximately 4:45 p.m. on October 26. (R., p.107.) At approximately 5:11 p.m., a female
driver driving a grey Mazda parked at the Moskee residence. (R., p.107.) The passenger, later
determined to be Mr. Flores, went into the Moskee residence, while the driver, later determined
to be Mrs. Flores, walked to pick up her 12-year-old son from school. (R., p.107; Tr., p.21, Ls.26.)

Mr. and Mrs. Flores and their son left the Moskee residence in the vehicle between

approximately 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. (R., pp.107-08.)
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Officer Brian Lueddeke followed the vehicle and observed the child moving unrestrained
in the backseat. (R., p.108.) Officer Jacob Durbin also followed the vehicle and observed the
driver fail to use a turn signal prior to making a turn. (R., p.108.) Officer Branden Esparza
testified at the preliminary hearing that he responded to a request to initiate a traffic stop of the
vehicle at approximately 6:00 p.m. 1 (11/30/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-7.). He testified he was listening
to radio traffic and “overheard them talking about a vehicle that they were following.” (11/30/16
Tr., p.21, Ls.12-17.) He said he did not initially know why the officers were following the
vehicle. (11/30/16 Tr., p.21, Ls.18-23.) He testified he was not familiar with the investigation
taking place at the Moskee residence. (11/30/16 Tr., p.21, L.24 – p.22, L.2.) Officer Esparza
said:
I was not [familiar with the investigation] – I did not realize where [the vehicle]
was coming from until later. Then I was advised what the stop was for. Or just
prior to me stopping, I was advised that this was a stop that they needed because
of possibly some drug business going on at an address. But I didn’t recognize
what the address was at the time.
(11/30/16 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-7.) The officer was asked whether he observed any traffic infractions,
and he answered, “I did not, no.” (11/30/16 Tr., p.23, L.25 – p.24, L.2.)
Officer Esparza stopped the vehicle.

(11/30/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.9-14.)

He asked the

passenger for his identification, and Mr. Flores provided his driver’s license. (11/30/16 Tr., p.15,
L.18 – p.16, L.3.) While Officer Esparza was running a warrants check, another officer arrived
with a drug detection dog.

(11/30/16 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-17.)

Officer Esparza then directed

Mr. Flores to exit the vehicle. (11/30/16 Tr., p.16, Ls.18-21.) He patted Mr. Flores down and
handcuffed him. (R., p.109.) He next directed Mrs. Flores to exit the vehicle. When Mrs. Flores

1

Officer Esparza testified only at the preliminary hearing. At the suppression hearing, the
district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript. (Tr., p.8, Ls.6-10.)
2

exited the vehicle, she gave the officer a small item which she said contained marijuana.
(11/30/16 Tr., p.16, L.24 – p.17, L.9.) The drug dog was then employed by the canine officer
and alerted on the vehicle. (11/30/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.11-19.) Officers searched the vehicle and
found a large cup in the center console area that contained plastic bags with heroin residue and
methamphetamine. (11/30/16 Tr., p.17, L.15 – p.20, L.3, p.33, L.17 – p.35, L.10.)
Following a preliminary hearing, Mr. Flores was charged by Information with two counts
of possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.29-30, 36-37.) The State subsequently filed an
Information Part II alleging Mr. Flores is a persistent violator within the meaning of Idaho
Code § 19-2514. (R., pp.51-52.) Mr. Flores filed a motion to suppress arguing the evidence
seized from the vehicle should be suppressed under the United States and Idaho Constitutions
because the officer who stopped the vehicle abandoned the purpose of the stop to pursue a drug
investigation that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. (R., pp.67-75.) Following a
hearing, the district court denied Mr. Flores’ motion to suppress. (R., pp.106-18.) The case
proceeded to trial, and the jury found Mr. Flores guilty on both counts. (R., p.154.) The jury
then found Mr. Flores guilty of two prior felony convictions, making him subject to the
persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.155.) The district court sentenced Mr. Flores as a
persistent violator to a unified term of 15 years, with three years fixed, on each count, to be
served concurrently. (Tr., p.538, Ls.12-15.) The judgment of conviction was filed on June 16,
2017, and Mr. Flores file a timely notice of appeal on June 19, 2017. (R., pp.213-17, 221-24.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Flores’ motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Flores’ Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Officer Esparza testified he pulled over the vehicle in which Mr. Flores was travelling

because he “was advised that this was a stop that they needed because of possibly some drug
business going on at an address.” (11/30/16 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-7.) While Officer Durbin had
observed a turn signal violation, Officer Esparza was not aware of the nature of the observed
violation. Mr. Flores does not dispute that, under the collective knowledge doctrine, Officer
Durbin’s knowledge can be imputed to Officer Esparza, and thus does not dispute that the stop of
the vehicle in which he was traveling was supported by reasonable suspicion of a traffic
violation. However, Mr. Flores contends Officer Esparza abandoned, from the outset, the
legitimate purpose of the stop, which was to investigate the traffic violation, because he was not
aware of the nature of the violation.

Mr. Flores also contends the district court erred in

concluding, in the alternative, that the stop of the vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion
of drug activity. Prior to the stop, none of the officers knew the identity of the individuals in the
vehicle, and there was insufficient evidence connecting the individuals in the vehicle to the
suspected drug activity at the Moskee residence.

B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted). “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional
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principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).

C.

Mr. Flores Was Seized In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment Because Officer Esparza
Abandoned From The Outset The Legitimate Purpose Of The Stop, Which Was To
Investigate The Traffic Violation
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const., amend. IV. In State v. Linze, the Idaho Supreme Court said:
The United States Supreme Court has plainly established that a traffic stop is a
seizure, but it is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment so long
as there is a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to
traffic laws. The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently
pursues the purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related.
However, should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer no longer
has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions. Indeed, when an
officer abandons his or her original purpose, the officer has for all intents and
purposes initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which requires its own
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. This new seizure cannot piggyback on the reasonableness of the original seizure. In other words, unless some
new reasonable suspicion or probable cause arises to justify the seizure’s new
purpose, a seized party’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the original
purpose of the stop is abandoned . . . .
161 Idaho 605, 609 (2016) (internal citation omitted). Here, Officer Esparza abandoned the
purpose of the stop from the outset by conducting a drug investigation instead of a traffic
investigation. The reasonable suspicion which supported a seizure for a traffic investigation did
not support a seizure for a drug investigation.
In the district court, counsel for Mr. Flores conceded the traffic stop was supported by
reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, but argued “there’s no reasonable suspicion to
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completely abandon the purpose of the stop, which was the traffic violation, failing to use a turn
signal, and completely throw that out the window and start doing [a] drug investigation.”
(Tr., p.62, Ls.21-25.) Counsel said, “The issue we have here is: Is there enough reasonable
suspicion to deviate from and abandon the purpose of the stop?” (Tr., p.67, Ls.18-21.) Counsel
argued that instead of pursing the traffic violation and writing a citation, the officer abandoned
the stop to conduct a drug investigation. (Tr., p.67, L.22 – p.68, L.1.)
The district court rejected this argument, reasoning that as long as an officer has an
objectively reasonable basis for making a stop based on an observed traffic violation, the
officer’s subjective motive for making the stop is irrelevant. (R., p.114 (citing State v. Myers,
118 Idaho 608 (Ct. App. 1990).) The district court misapprehended defense counsel’s argument.
It is true that Officer Esparza’s subjective motivation for making the stop is not relevant, but that
is not the issue. Where, as here, the reasonable suspicion for a stop is based on another officer’s
knowledge of a traffic violation, and the officer making the stop is not aware of the nature of the
violation, the seizure is unlawful at the outset as the officer cannot possibly pursue the original
purpose of the stop, which is to investigate the traffic violation.
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Esparza testified he was listening to radio traffic and
“overheard them talking about a vehicle they were following.” (11/30/16 Tr., p.21, Ls.12-17.)
He was asked whether he knew why they were following it, and answered, “Initially, no, until I
just – and then I heard that they needed – that – of the violations, they needed a patrol vehicle to
stop it. And so then that’s where I picked it up.” (11/30/16 Tr., p.21, Ls.18-23.) While he
arguably was aware of a traffic violation, it is clear Officer Esparza was not aware of the nature
of the violation. The officer was asked whether he observed any traffic infractions, and he
answered, “I did not, no.” (11/30/16 Tr., p.23, L.25 – p.24, L.2.) Officer Esparza testified that
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“just prior to me stopping, I was advised that this was a stop that they needed because of possibly
some drug business going on at an address.” (11/30/16 Tr., p.22, Ls.3-6.) When Officer Esparza
stopped the vehicle, he did not—and could not—have diligently pursued the traffic investigation
because he was unware of the nature of the violation. Indeed, there is no evidence Officer
Esparza intended to, or was in the process of, completing a traffic citation.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that “the tolerable duration of police
inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (internal citations omitted).

Mr. Flores was

unlawfully seized because the officer who stopped the vehicle in which he was traveling never
addressed, and could not have addressed, the traffic violation that provided the reasonable
suspicion for the stop, as he was not aware of the nature of the violation. Because Officer
Esparza abandoned the legitimate purpose of the stop from the outset, Mr. Flores was seized in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

D.

The District Court Erred In Concluding, In The Alternative, That The Stop Of The
Vehicle In Which Mr. Flores Was Traveling Was Supported By Reasonable Suspicion Of
Drug Activity
The district court concluded, in the alternative, that the officers had reasonable suspicion

to conduct a drug investigation from the outset based on the totality of the circumstances.
(R., pp.116-17.) The district court explained:
The stop of the vehicle was not an isolated event. Officers had ample information
prior to stopping the vehicle regarding the house from which the vehicle came.
There was concern regarding children’s safety in the home based on the 14-yearold’s report that her parents were using heroin and had visitors frequenting the
home. A concerned citizen also reported that the home received frequent visitors
and stop and go traffic. Defendant and his wife used to be roommates with the
14-year-old girl’s parents. Defendant and his wife stopped at the Moskee
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residence for at least 20 minutes and left with Defendant’s step-son unbuckled in
the backseat, apparently driving quickly and evasively through neighborhoods on
an indirect route to the destination of the final stop. Under these facts and
circumstances, it was reasonable to investigate into the welfare of Defendant’s
step-son as well as to inquire as to whether the parents possessed illegal
substances.
(R., p.117.) The district court erred in concluding there was reasonable suspicion of drug
activity prior to the stop of the vehicle. Most critically, before Officer Esparza stopped the grey
Mazda, none of the officers knew the identity of the individuals in the vehicle. The mere fact
that the vehicle had stopped for at least 20 minutes at a suspected drug house in the late
afternoon did not provide the officers with reasonable suspicion that the people in the vehicle
were involved in drug activity.
“A reasonable suspicion exists when the . . . officers can articulate specific facts which,
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably justify a suspicion that criminal
activity is occurring.” State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409-10 (2012) (citation omitted). “[T]he
reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances at
the time of the stop.” Id. at 410 (emphasis added). Here, at the time of the stop, there were
insufficient facts to justify a suspicion that Mr. and Mrs. Flores was involved in drug activity.
The fact that they stopped at the Moskee residence for a brief period in the late afternoon
indicates they did not live at the Moskee residence, and the fact that they arrived as a couple and
left with their son suggests they were in fact there to pick up their son from the nearby school.
At the suppression hearing, the district court admitted an Affidavit for Search Warrant,
dated November 1, 2016 (“the Affidavit”).2 (Motion to Augment, Ex. A.) The Affidavit was

2

The Affidavit for Search Warrant was admitted at the hearing on Mr. Flores’ motion to
suppress, but was not included in the Clerk’s Record. Simultaneously with the filing of this
brief, Mr. Flores is filing a Motion to Augment to include a copy of this document in the Clerk’s
9

prepared by Officer Jason Brown in support of a search warrant for the Moskee residence. (Id.,
pp.1, 3.) In the Affidavit, Officer Brown describes in detail the report from the 14-year-old girl
who said her parents were using heroin at the Moskee residence. (Id. pp.4-5.) Officer Brown
discusses the investigation at the Moskee residence, including information from a “concerned
citizen” reporting “stop and go traffic . . . at all hours of the night.” (Id., p.6.) Officer Brown
describes the surveillance that led to the stop of the vehicle in which Mr. Flores was travelling.
(Id., pp.7-8.) Critically, the Affidavit reflects that none of the officers knew the identity of the
individuals in the vehicle until after the traffic stop. (Id., p.7.) Prior to the stop, the only
information the officers had connecting the vehicle to any drug activity at the Moskee residence
was the fact that the vehicle arrived at the residence at 5:11 p.m., and departed at 5:30 p.m. (Id.)
Even with the benefit of the collective knowledge doctrine, this is simply not enough to support a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.
In concluding there was reasonable suspicion to support a drug investigation, the district
court relied, in part, on the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Flores used to be roommates with the parents
of the 14-year-old girl who reported her suspicions of her parents’ drug activity to the police.
This was an error. Though this information is included in the Affidavit, it was not known to the
officers at the time of the stop, and thus cannot be considered as part of the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion of drug activity sufficient
to justify the stop. Mr. Flores concedes Officer Esparza had reasonable suspicion of a traffic
violation, justifying a limited seizure of the vehicle and its occupants to investigate that violation.

Record. The Affidavit for Search Warrant was filed under seal in the district court, and is being
filed under seal with this Court.
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However, the district court erred in concluding there was reasonable suspicion for a drug
investigation.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Flores respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, reverse
the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2018.
____________/s/___________________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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